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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I study individuals’ prosocial behaviors. I focus on the topics of
charitable giving, measuring altruism, and trust.
The first essay studies the effectiveness of fundraising campaigns with volunteer lead-
ers in charitable giving. We ask: 1) Does having volunteer leaders increase contributions
from potential donors?, and 2) What factors increase or decrease the impact of volunteer
leaders on charitable giving? We find that the effectiveness of leadership depends on the
specific context. Volunteers are generally more effective in increasing follower donations,
but themselves give less than randomly-selected leaders. Social distance of the leader has
little effect on fundraising.
The second essay is directly related to altruism, the altruistic motivation for charitable
giving. Altruism has been measured in the lab using dictator games, where some scholars
use only one decision and others use multiple decisions. The latter has gained remark-
able popularity in identifying heterogeneous distributional preferences among populations
and found the prevailing existence of preferences for efficiency relative to preferences for
equality. We examine the effect of playing both roles in the dictator games with multiple
decisions. We ask: 1) Does playing both roles change behavior?, and 2) If so, should we
rethink the measure of distributional preferences? We find that dual role procedure distorts
revealed preferences. Dual role procedure leads to greater price sensitivity, and overesti-
mates preferences for efficiency and underestimates preferences for equality. We also find
evidences that only single role measurement predicts real life giving.
In the third essay we ask: 1) Does altruism explain individual trust and trustworthy
behavior?, and 2) Are trust and trustworthiness norms? We find that altruism predicts
trust, while both fairness and trust predict trustworthiness. Trust and trustworthiness could
ii
be explained by following norms. Our results suggest the presence of norms that elicit
trusting and trustworthy behavior.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional economic models assume individuals are self-interested utility maximizers.
However, both our day-to-day experiences and a significant body of research suggest that
concerns about others also play an important role in shaping individuals’ decisions across
different situations. Individuals appear to be willing to sacrifice their own benefit for the
well-being of others. Understanding people’s preferences for tradeoffs between self and
others has important applications for not just economists, but also for practitioners and
policy makers. This dissertation employs laboratory experiments to study individuals’
prosocial behavior. One chapter examines the impact of volunteer leaders on donor’s
giving. One chapter examines the measure of altruism. The other chapter studies trust,
trustworthiness and how are they shaped by norms.
In Chapter II, titled “The Impact of Volunteer Leaders in Charitable Giving”, Catherine
and I examine the impact of volunteer leaders on donors’ giving. Charities often engage
in fundraising campaigns that utilize volunteer leaders. Examples include the American
Heart Association’s annual “Dear Neighbor Campaign” and the Leukemia Lymphoma
Society’s “Team in Training.” While these fundraising techniques are commonly used,
there is little research assessing their effectiveness or exploring the mechanisms underly-
ing their impact. I received a grant from Science of Philanthropy Initiative to study this
question. We designed a “real-donation” laboratory experiment to study the role of lead-
ership in fundraising. In our study, subjects are randomly assigned to groups that then
have the opportunity to donate any part of their endowment to three alternative projects.
We compare volunteer and randomly-selected leaders, and vary whether the leader’s do-
nations are observed by followers. A third factor varies whether the preferences of the
leader over the projects coincide with those of the follower. Our analysis focuses on these
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three dimensions: 1) the status of the leader; 2) information about donations; and 3) so-
cial distance. We find that the effectiveness of leadership depends on the specific context.
Volunteers are generally more effective in increasing follower donations, but themselves
give less than randomly-selected leaders. Social distance of the leader has little effect on
fundraising.
In Chapter III, titled “Does How We Measure Altruism Matter?: Playing Both Roles in
Dictator Games”, Catherine, Phil and I take a step back from charitable giving, to examine
altruism, an important underlying motive for charitable giving. Altruism has been mea-
sured in the lab with dictator games, with some scholars using experiments that reward
subjects based on only one decision while others pay subjects based on multiple decisions.
The latter approach has gained remarkable popularity for identifying heterogeneity in dis-
tributional preferences among the population. One of its most notable findings is the preva-
lence of preferences for efficiency relative to preferences for equality. Our concern was
that paying subjects for more than one decision may have distorted the assessment of such
preferences. We designed an experiment to directly test the impact of the payment method
on revealed preferences. Participants in our experiment play a series of dictator games,
where one player determines the distribution of a fixed amount of money between herself
and another player. We vary endowments and relative prices for giving to recipients. In the
single role treatment (SR), subjects are assigned as either dictators or recipients, and paid
for one decision in one role; in the dual role treatment (DR) all subjects make decisions
in the dictator role, and are matched twice and paid for two decisions, once in the role
of dictator, and once as a recipient. While in both treatments the preferences for giving
are typically rational, in the sense of being consistent with the Generalized Axiom of Re-
vealed Preference (GARP), we find that subjects in DR display greater sensitivity to the
price of giving compared to subjects in SR, who are more likely to divide earnings equally
regardless of the price. When estimating a CES utility function to recover the underlying
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individual preferences for giving, we find that the distributions of preferences are quite dif-
ferent across the two treatments: Subjects in DR are substantially more efficiency-focused
and more likely to be selfish than the SR subjects. Because individual donation decisions
are rarely “reciprocated” in this way, we believe the SR protocol is likely to be a more
accurate measure of altruistic preferences. An additional study shows that the observed
differences in preferences across treatments are not due to the differences in total payoffs
between the two treatments. Our results shed light on a better design for measurement of
altruism.
Prosocial behavior could be shaped by individual preferences, but could also be in-
fluenced by social norms. In Chapter VI, titled “Trust, Altruism and Social Norms”,
Catherine and I replicate a study of the trust game [Cox, 2004], which was designed to
deconstruct the motives for “trust” behavior in the game. His design makes it possible
to discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers result-
ing from altruism. We augment his design by adding coordination games to elicit social
norms directly for the three component games of his “triadic” design. We combine the
norms data with separately measured decisions to better understand patterns of behavior
across the three games. We find that altruism predicts trust. Both fairness and trust predict
trustworthiness. Both trust and trustworthiness could be explained by following norms.
Our results suggest the presence of norms that elicit trusting and trustworthy behavior.
3
2. THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTEER LEADERS ON CHARITABLE GIVING
2.1 Introduction
In fundraising campaigns, instead of making a direct appeal to potential donors, char-
ities and non-profits often utilize volunteer leaders recruited specifically to make the ap-
peal on their behalf. Examples include: neighborhood campaigns (e.g, the “Dear Neighbor
Campaign” by the American Heart Association), and athletic event fundraisers (e.g, “Team
in Training” by the Leukemia & Lymphoma Society). Although this fundraising approach
is frequently adopted, there is little research on whether and under what conditions this
mechanism should be successful. Our study is designed to experimentally investigate the
impact of volunteer leaders on potential donors’ contribution behaviors.
We are interested in answering the following research questions. First, we examine
whether having volunteer leaders gives rise to higher contributions from potential donors.
Second, if it does, what factors increase or decrease the impact of volunteer leaders. This
will allow us to identify circumstances under which this fundraising strategy is likely to
be effective and gauge its impact on fundraising in the short run and the long run.
There may be many different reasons that fundraising campaigns with volunteer lead-
ers would be successful. Previous research suggests that the volunteer leaders may play
an informative role; that is, by making an appeal to potential donors on behalf of the char-
ity, volunteer leaders may send a signal about the quality of the charity [Vesterlund, 2003,
Potters et al., 2007]. Existing research also finds that concerns for status may affect donors’
charitable giving [Eckel et al., 2010]. In this paper, we also examine whether social dis-
tance may be one factor explaining the observed success of volunteer leader campaigns,
since it plays an important role in many related settings [Chen and Li, 2009]. A commonly
held belief among practitioners is that potential donors respond more favorably to appeals
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made by persons to whom they are closely related socially or even spatially. By inserting a
volunteer leader who is known to the donor into the appeal process, the decrease in social
distance may affect potential donors’ contribution behavior.
We design a “real donation” laboratory experiment to study the role of volunteer lead-
ers. In our experiment, participants are assigned to groups of four and then have the oppor-
tunity to donate some of their endowments to the online charity DonorsChoose.org. We
manipulate the selection procedure for leaders, the information content of their messages,
and the way donation groups are formed. With a between-subject design, we compare
volunteer and randomly-selected leaders, and vary whether the leader’s donations are ob-
served by followers. A third factor varies whether the preferences of the leader over the
projects coincide with those of the followers. Our analysis focuses on these three dimen-
sions: 1) the status of the leader; 2) information about donations; and 3) social distance.
We find that the effectiveness of leadership depends on the specific context. Volunteers are
generally more effective in increasing follower donations, but themselves give less than
randomly-selected leaders. Social distance of the leader has little effect on fundraising.
By investigating a number of factors that may influence donors’ response toward vol-
unteer leaders, our research increases our understanding of the motives that underlie indi-
vidual’s giving behavior, as well as advances our understanding of how individuals react
to different fundraising strategies. The behavioral regularities we identify could be used
to develop more accurate theories of fundraising, and ultimately more effective, targeted
fundraising campaigns that utilize volunteer leaders.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 offers a conceptual
framework of leadership in charitable giving. Section 2.3 describes the experimental de-
sign. In Section 2.4, we discuss the results. Section 2.5 concludes.
5
2.2 Conceptual Framework
We build our hypotheses on the basis of the following three literature streams in char-
itable giving.
2.2.1 Sequential Donations and Social Status
We begin with previous research that has investigated the interdependencies among in-
dividual contributors. Our research is related to the literature studying fundraising mecha-
nisms that account for this interdependence, such as sequential fundraising and leadership
giving. The theoretical work on sequential fundraising begins with [Varian, 1994], who
builds a simple theoretical model to compare contributions with and without announce-
ments. The model predicts that fundraisers should prefer not to announce past contribu-
tions to potential donors. His argument is that the initial donors will choose to make a small
contribution and leave it to subsequent donors to donate to the charity. But this result is in
sharp contrast to established practices of charitable organizations, which often begin their
campaigns by soliciting wealthy, respected individuals in a community, and prominently
announcing their contributions. [Romano and Yildirim, 2001] extend Varian’s model to a
general class of preferences, and show that, relative to simultaneous giving, sequential giv-
ing increases contributions to a public good when followers respond positively to increases
in leader giving. This increase is sufficient to compensate leaders’ cost of contributing. Ex-
perimental research tends to support fundraising practice; both laboratory and field studies
have found evidence that, when the announced initial contribution is large, individuals
contribute more [List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002, Shang and Croson, 2003].
One explanation for the positive correlation between the initial giving and subsequent
giving is the information value of the initial gift. [Vesterlund, 2003] and [Andreoni, 2006]
explore theoretically the case where the leader’s gift can be a signal of the quality of the
charitable good. That is, a sufficiently large initial contribution informs future donors
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that the charity is of high quality; inferring the higher quality, the follower will make a
larger contribution as well. [Vesterlund, 2003] examines an environment where charities
have hidden qualities, either high or low, and donors can learn the true quality at a cost.
She finds that in this situation, both high and low quality charities will reveal the past
contributions; a positive contribution by leaders will signal that the charitable good is
of high quality to subsequent donors. [Potters et al., 2007] use experimental methods to
examine contributions in an environment where there is uncertainty about the quality of a
public good. They show that sequential giving results in larger overall contributions, and
that their results are consistent with the signaling hypothesis.
Concerns for social status have also been shown to influence donations. Follow-
ing [Ball et al., 2001],[Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010] induce high and low status based on
participants’ score on a trivia quiz. They find that, in a sequential-contribution public
good experiment, high status first-movers are more likely to be mimicked by second-
movers. Overall contributions double when high status members move first. The social
status of a leader has been shown to serve a useful purpose in public goods provision.
[Eckel et al., 2010] study the impact of the social status of a central player in a star net-
work on public goods provision within the network. The network has a central player who
can observe the set of all players, however the players themselves can only observe the
central player. High or low status is granted based on trivia quiz results, and announced
to the other members of the network. They find that high status central players are more
likely to be followed, and higher contributions can result, but only when the central players
are high contributors.
In contrast to earlier studies, our paper addresses volunteer leadership. In this fundrais-
ing mechanism, volunteer leaders act as active solicitors of other potential donors on behalf
of the charity. Despite the popularity of fundraisers with volunteer leaders, there is little
research explaining whether and why they are successful. While there are clearly many
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reasons that we might see fundraising using volunteer leaders, previous research suggests
two likely explanations: uncertainty about the charity quality, and the potential positive ef-
fect of a high-status exemplar. We ask what role these two factors play in fundraising with
volunteer leaders. We anticipate that potential donors will respond more favorably (i.e.,
with greater incidence of donation, or higher contribution amount) to fundraising appeals
made by volunteer leaders versus appeals made directly from the non-profit organization.
On the basis of previous research and practice, we hypothesize that both information
and concerns for status will influence charitable giving behavior.
Hypothesis 1: A volunteer leader elicits higher contributions from potential donors.
2.2.2 Communication
Previous research has empirically shown that leaders can directly influence group
members via one-way communication [Koukoumelis et al., 2012]. Their experimental
context is public good provision with one-way communication. One member in the group
can send a free-text message to his fellow group members. They find that the introduc-
tion of one-way communication substantially increases contributions and decreases their
variation. [Arbak and Villeval, 2011] study the emergence of leadership in the laboratory
setting. In one treatment they have participants volunteer to be leaders where leading the
group means contributing first and making this contribution visible. In a second treatment
leaders are randomly selected. They find that a large proportion of subjects volunteer to
lead even though it is costly. Voluntary leaders improve efficiency in their team but they
are not necessarily more influential than randomly imposed leaders.
[Croson, 2007] reports a strong correlation between others’ contributions and one’s
own. In experiments that elicited participants’ beliefs about how much they think others
will contribute, she finds that contributions are positively correlated with beliefs because
subjects want to match or reciprocate giving by others. We aim to test the hypothesis that
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potential donors’ contributions are correlated with observed volunteer leaders’ contribu-
tions.
Hypothesis 2: Information about the leader’s own contribution positively affects dona-
tions: the more the leader gives, the more other donors give.
2.2.3 Social Distance and Leadership
Another purpose of this paper is to examine whether social distance can be the explana-
tion for the frequently observed volunteer leader approach. Many recent studies illustrate
the impact of social distance on social influence in decision making. We discuss the most
relevant of these.
Social distance - the closeness between individuals and groups - has been acknowl-
edged to have a profound influence on charitable giving. [Hoffman et al., 1996] suggest
that the decrease in social distance between the experimenter and subjects, and between
the donor and recipient, increases donations in dictator games. [Andreoni et al., 2003]
find that revealing subjects’ photographs to other participants has a positive effect on
contributions, an even greater impact than revealing the distribution of group contribu-
tions. [Leider et al., 2009] conduct online experiments in large real-world social networks
to decompose giving into: baseline altruism toward strangers, directed altruism that favors
friends, and the prospect of future interaction. They find that generosity decreases with so-
cial distance. [DellaVigna et al., 2012] incorporate social pressure into charitable giving
decisions. They conduct a field experiment in which potential donors have the opportunity
to avoid contact with solicitors. Their findings suggest that social pressure is an important
determinant of giving.
The fact that social distance can affect giving suggests that it also may be influential
in our specific fundraising environment. By inserting volunteer leaders into the appeal
process, the decrease in social distance may affect potential donors’ contribution behavior.
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We wish to determine whether and how social distance may help explain the success of
fundraising with volunteer leaders.
A common way of manipulating social distance in psychological experiments, as well
as in economical experiments, is through the creation of artificial groups [Chen and Li, 2009].
We will manipulate the group cohesion to test the social distance hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Potential donors respond more favorably to a solicitation with decreas-
ing social distance of the leader.
Finally, there is recent empirical research that examines how the social interaction af-
fects charitable giving. [Meer, 2011] focuses on peer effects in solicitation. He examines
whether alumni are more likely to give if the solicitation comes from someone they know.
He finds that social ties affect both the decision to donate and the gift size. [Carman, 2003]
studies peer effects in charitable giving among workplace teams. She finds that the indi-
viduals respond positively to higher levels of mean giving within their group. Interestingly,
and in line with the references above, she also suggests that the team captain plays a role
in the team’s contribution.
2.3 Experimental Design
In order to study the impact of volunteer leaders on charitable giving, we design a
“real charity” laboratory experiment in which participants are given endowments from
which they have the opportunity to donate to three alternative projects selected from
DonorsChoose.org, an online charitable organization that allows individuals to donate di-
rectly to specific projects at public schools across the country.
All sessions were conducted at the Economics Science Lab at Texas AM University,
using students recruited through ORSEE [Greiner, 2015]. In each session, subjects were
seated at computer terminals upon arrival. The experiments were programed in zTree
[Fischbacher, 2007]. The experiment began with participants reading instructions on a
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computer screen. We made it clear that all subjects were identified only by subject IDs
and that all of their decisions were anonymous. We explained that the experiment would
consist of a “ranking task”, during which they would be asked to rank three projects ac-
cording to the order in which they would like to see them funded, and an “allocation task”,
during which they would be asked to allocate their endowments between themselves and
each of the three projects. One of these decisions would be randomly selected by the
monitor for payment at the end of the session. A monitor was selected randomly for each
session in order to ensure that all the money donated in the session would be sent online
to the chosen project at DonorsChoose.org.
Currently there are approximately 20,000 projects seeking funding on DonorsChoose.org.
These project requests are posted by teachers from public schools across the country.
Projects cover a wide range of subject areas, including music and arts, literacy and lan-
guage, math and science, history and civics, health and sports, etc. The types of re-
sources requested vary from books and classroom supplies to field trips and class visitors.
The organization accepts projects from classrooms from pre-kindergarden through second
grades, and ninth through twelfth grades. Since the projects vary across several dimen-
sions, we fix the classroom grade to Pre-K-2, grades with the most project requests, and
we choose the first four projects with different subject areas from the “most urgent” list
(the list of projects from high poverty schools and closest to the finish line). We provide
each subject with a Project Description Handout sheet including a total of three projects.
The project description has basic information on each project including the project title,
subject, resource requested, and a short project objective written by the requesting teacher.
An example of a project description is provided in Figure 2.1.
In the “ranking task”, subjects were asked to rank all three projects according to the
order in which they would like to see them funded. After completing the ranking task,
participants were given a $20 endowment, in addition to their $5 show-up fee. They were
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Figure 2.1: Project Description Example
then divided into groups of four (details of treatments are described below). After groups
were formed, a leader was selected for each group, either randomly, or through a process
whereby group members have the opportunity to volunteer to be a leader. Once leaders
were selected, they receive a message on their computer screen identifying them as the
leader of their groups. The leaders were then shown an appeal message, the message of
solicitation on behalf of DonorsChoose.org. As leader, they were tasked with forwarding
the appeal message to the members of their groups. Leaders made allocation decisions
after sending out the appeal message. After receiving the message, other group members
made their allocation decisions. The prescribed message is provided as follows:
“Dear Participant:
DonorsChoose.org is an online charity connecting individual donors to pub-
lic school classrooms in need. Its mission is to engage the public in public
education by giving individuals a simple, accountable, and personal way to
fund educational projects in public schools across the country.
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On behalf of DonorsChoose.org I am asking all of the members of group
Green to please consider making a donation to help implement projects that
augment learning experiences in public school classrooms. On the following
screen you will be able to allocate a donation to any or all of the projects
described below. Thank you for your consideration of our request.
Sincerely,
Leader of Group Green”
There are six treatments in total in our experiment. No information random grouping
with a random leader is the baseline treatment (Treatment 1). In the baseline, after finish-
ing the ranking task, all participants are randomly assigned into groups of four. A group
member will be selected randomly as leader. Leaders send the appeal message (shown
above) on behalf of the charity to other group members before the allocation task begins.
The leader’s contribution will not be observed by other group members. The remaining
treatments vary in leader selection (random or volunteer leaders), leader contribution in-
formation (whether leaders’ contribution could be observed by the followers or not), or
group cohesiveness (random groups or groups that share similar project preferences). Ta-
ble 2.1 presents the list of treatments and the number of subjects who participated in each
treatment. All in all, we have 240 participants in six treatments.
Treatment # of Observations
1. Random Group, Random Leader, No Information 36
2. Random Group, Random Leader, Information 40
3. Random Group, Volunteer Leader, No Information 36
4. Random Group, Volunteer Leader, Information 40
5. Preference Group, Random Leader, No Information 44
6. Preference Group, Volunteer Leader, No information 44
Table 2.1: Treatments
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2.4 Results
Table 2.2 presents mean donations by treatment. When pool the random leader treat-
ments and volunteer leader treatments, we find average percentage contributions of 26.97%
for the random leader treatment and 32.34% for the volunteer leader treatments.
Treatment Mean Giving (%) # of Observations
1. Random Group, Random Leader, No Information 22.85 36
2. Random Group, Random Leader, Information 26.42 40
3. Random Group, Volunteer Leader, No Information 32.40 36
4. Random Group, Volunteer Leader, Information 30.65 40
5. Preference Group, Random Leader, No Information 31.65 44
6. Preference Group, Volunteer Leader, No Information 33.98 44
Total Random Leader (Treatment 1 + 2 + 5) 26.97 120
Total Volunteer Leader (Treatment 3 + 4 + 6) 32.34 120
Table 2.2: Mean Giving by Treatment
Hypothesis 1. A volunteer leader elicits higher contributions from potential donors.
Results: We find that overall giving is higher with volunteer leaders relative to with
random leaders.
Support: To determine how does having volunteer leaders affect subjects’ giving be-
haviour, we conduct regression analysis with the giving (percentage of endowment allo-
cated to the charity) as dependent variable. Table 2.3 reports the results of a random effects
model with standard errors clustered at group level. We find that having a volunteer leader
increases the average giving significantly by 9.546. The results hold after we control for
demographics.
Hypothesis 2: Information about the leader’s own contribution positively affects do-
nations: the more the leader gives, the more other donors give.
Results: Regarding the effect of observing leaders’ contribution, we find mixed re-
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Dependent Variable: Giving (1) (2) (3)
Observed 0.908 3.565 3.690
(3.262) (4.086) (4.072)
Volunteer 6.750** 9.546** 9.507**
(3.257) (4.699) (4.751)
Observed x Volunteer -5.313 -5.379
(6.471) (6.548)
Rank -13.20***
(1.089)
Female 0.0322
(3.321)
Age -0.289
(0.721)
Constant 24.25*** 22.85*** 55.33***
(2.620) (2.839) (16.13)
Observations 456 456 456
R2 (Overall) 0.018 0.020 0.197
Random Effects Model (GLS) with clustered standard errors at the group level
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.3: Effect of Volunteer Leaders
sults. Followers respond to the information of the leaders’ contribution differently de-
pending on whether they are random leaders or volunteer leaders.
Support: Table 2.4 reports separate regression results for treatment 3 and 4, the two
treatments where leaders’ contributions could be observed by the followers. When the
leader is randomly selected, followers’ contributions are not correlated with the amount
the leader sent. But when volunteer leaders are allowed, followers respond to volunteer
leaders’ contributions positively, the more the leader gives, the more other donors give.
Hypothesis 3: Potential donors respond more favorably to a solicitation with decreas-
ing social distance of the leader.
Results: We find social distance of the leader has effect on fundraising only when the
leader is randomly chosen.
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Dependent Variable Giving by Followers Giving by Followers
Random Leader Volunteer Leader
Giving by Leaders 0.0388 0.125**
(0.0825) (0.0629)
Project rank -10.60*** -12.54***
(1.716) (1.611)
Female -0.0661 -8.236
(7.889) (7.714)
Age -1.183 0.947
(1.538) (1.408)
Constant 67.97* 38.35
(34.72) (29.71)
Observations 90 90
R2 (Overall) 0.153 0.217
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.4: Effect of Observing Leaders’ Giving
Support: We compare potential donors’ contributions in the baseline treatment to po-
tential donors’ contributions in the preference based group treatment (treatment 5). In
treatment 5 participants are grouped according to the results of their ranking task. Par-
ticipants with similar preferences are grouped together. With the data from treatment 1
and 5 we can compare contribution behavior between random groups and groups that
are formed based on preferences. This comparison allows us to investigate whether the
responding contribution behavior differs depending on social distance. The comparison
between treatment 2 and 6 helps us to study the interaction of social distance with vol-
unteer leaders. We find decreasing social distance of the leader results in more than 30%
increase in total giving when the leader is randomly chosen. We find no significant effect
with volunteer leaders.
In order to study leaders’ behavior, we conduct regression analysis for leaders only
again with giving as the dependent variable. Table 2.5 reports the results of a random
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effects model of leaders’ giving behavior. We find that both volunteering and observability
increase leader giving. We also find evidence that leaders treat volunteering and giving as
substitutes.
(1) (2)
Giving by leaders Giving by leaders
Observed 12.94** 29.61***
(5.881) (7.560)
Volunteer 4.877 22.32***
(5.873) (7.913)
Observed x Volunteer -33.38***
(10.69)
Project rank -13.70*** -13.59***
(1.889) (1.939)
Constant 43.18*** 35.56***
(6.411) (7.954)
Observations 114 114
R2 (Overall) 0.265 0.373
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.5: The Effect of Observability on Leaders
2.5 Conclusion
There are several reasons that fundraising campaigns with volunteer leaders may be
successful. In order to provide the needed insight into when this mechanism is likely
effective, this paper examines three factors that may affect the impact of volunteer leaders
derived from the existing literature: the status of the leader, information about donations,
and social distance of the leader.
We design a “real donation” laboratory experiment to study the impact of volunteer
leaders on charitable giving. We find that the effectiveness of leadership depends on the
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specific context. Volunteers are generally more effective in increasing follower donations,
but themselves give less than randomly-selected leaders. Social distance of the leader has
little effect on fundraising. Further research (and replication) is necessary before we draw
strong conclusions.
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3. DOES HOW WE MEASURE ALTRUISM MATTER?: PLAYING BOTH ROLES
IN DICTATOR GAMES
3.1 Introduction
Distributional preferences shape individual opinions concerning economic inequality
and redistribution. Although most economists assume individuals are self-interested utility
maximizers, both day-to-day experiences and a significant body of research suggest that
concerns about social welfare also play an important role in shaping individuals’ decisions
across a wide variety of situations. Understanding the tradeoffs between fairness and
selfishness, equality and efficiency thus has important applications for designing optimal
public policies.
In recent research regarding distributional preferences, the modified dictator games
devised by [Andreoni and Miller, 2002] (AM in the following) have gained remarkable
popularity in identifying heterogeneous distributional preferences in the population. Sub-
jects in AM play a series of dictator games allocating tokens between self and other that
vary both the relative price of giving and the available budget. This design captures
both subjects’ selfishness (weight on payoff of self) and efficiency-equity tradeoffs (con-
cerns for increasing total payoffs versus concerns for reducing differences in payoffs).
Distributional preferences measured using the AM design are used to explain important
issues such as political participation [Dawes et al., 2011] and intergenerational sharing
[Porter and Adams, 2015], and to predict career choices [Fisman et al., 2015b], among
other applications. Surprisingly, studies implementing the AM design present significant
evidence of preferences for efficiency over preferences for equality, in contrast to the per-
sistent findings of fairness preferences in the literature using standard dictator games. One
noticeable difference between the AM design and a standard dictator game lies in the pay-
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ment method. In a standard dictator game [Forsythe et al., 1994], a single role procedure
is carried out, where a subject in the dictator role decides how much of the endowment to
allocate between herself and a partner, who is in the recipient role. In the modified dictator
games as in AM, subjects play in both roles, in the sense that they are paid once as a dic-
tator, and once as a recipient of someone else’s dictator decision. The existing literature
in dictator games shows that subjects are sensitive to the description and the procedu-
ral details of the game [Eckel and Grossman, 1996, Hoffman et al., 1994, Engel, 2011]. It
has also been shown in other experimental games that playing both roles affect subjects’
pro-social behaviour [Burks et al., 2003, Güth et al., 1982].
Playing both roles may influence subjects in dictator games in a number of ways. First,
playing both roles may prompt subjects to empathize with their matched recipients. If this
were the case, we would expect playing both roles to increase giving. On the other hand,
implementing decisions for both roles may cause subjects to feel less responsibility for
their partners, resulting in less overall giving. Studying the effect of playing both roles
may help us to understand the relative absence of preferences for fairness in studies using
the AM design as compared to studies using a standard dictator game. We are not aware of
any experiments that directly examine the effects of single-role and dual-role procedures
in dictator games, even though both procedures are commonly used in literature.
In this paper, we aim to compare individual distributional preferences in modified dic-
tator games with subjects playing both roles with those where subjects playing a single
role. Participants in our experiment play a series of dictator games similar to AM. Our
dual role treatment (DR) replicates the procedure in AM where subjects are paid for both
roles, as dictators and as recipients. In the single role treatment (SR), subjects are assigned
either as dictators or recipients and paid for only one role.
We find that the dual-role design overstates preferences for efficiency and understates
concerns for equality compared to the single-role design. Subjects in DR sessions give
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less (22 percent) of their endowment, on average, than in SR sessions (35 percent). In
both treatments the preferences for giving are typically rational in the sense of being con-
sistent with GARP. However, there is a striking difference between the two treatments in
the preference for efficiency over equality: Subjects in DR display greater sensitivity to
the price of giving compared to subjects in SR. We estimate the distribution of social pref-
erences by estimating individual CES utility functions, recovering underlying preferences
for giving. The distributions of preferences differ dramatically across the two treatments:
while 19% of subjects in DR display selfish preferences, only 5% subjects in SR are selfish;
53% of subjects in SR present a preference for equality , but only 19% in DR. In addition,
having subjects play both roles increases the proportion of subjects with a preference for
efficiency by 47.6% (42% in SR vs. 62% in DR).
In an additional study, we implement an additional treatment to test whether the dif-
ference between dual-role procedure and single-role procedure are due to the reduced re-
sponsibility in dual-role procedure as we discussed above or due to the differences in final
payoffs (subjects in DR are paid twice thus on average earn more than subjects in SR).
We find the effect of playing both roles on distributional preferences is preserved even
after controlling for the differences in final earnings. When using the estimated altruism
parameters from both DR and SR protocols to predict real life giving, we find that only
the measures derived from the SR data are correlated with subjects’ past giving behaviour.
This leads us to believe that the SR protocol is likely to be a more accurate measure of
altruistic preferences.
3.2 Modified dictator games and playing both roles
AM originally designed their modified dictator games to address the question of whether
or not other-regarding behaviour is consistent with rational choice theory. In their ex-
periments, subjects made a series of modified dictator game decisions that varied both
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the available budget and the relative price of giving, allowing the authors to test whether
choices are consistent with the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP). They
find that the majority of their subjects’ choices are consistent with maximization of a quasi-
concave utility function. AM also find a great deal of heterogeneity across subjects, with
a large numbers of subjects having selfish preferences and others having other-regarding
preferences. Many subjects showed a strong preference for efficiency over equality in
their allocation decisions. Finally they estimate a CES utility function with two parame-
ters, a selfishness parameter and an efficiency parameter, which are used in the subsequent
literature as measurements of distributional preferences.
[Fisman et al., 2007] extend the AM design by implementing a graphic computer in-
terface and increasing the number of decisions from the eight or eleven used in AM to
fifty. They also expand AM’s analysis to estimate individual preference parameters. Con-
sistent with AM, they also find evidence in favour of preferences for efficiency as well as
considerable heterogeneity among subjects.
Both AM and extensions of their design have been used in a number of papers to
measure distributional preferences. [Dawes et al., 2011] explored the influence of dif-
ferent types of social preferences measured by the AM design on political participation.
They found that subjects who exhibit higher preferences for efficiency are more likely
to participate in politics than those who are concerned with equalizing resources among
individuals. [Fisman et al., 2015a] find that the Great Recession increased selfishness.
[Porter and Adams, 2015] compare the preferences for giving to strangers and parents and
find that giving to parents is more sensitive to price as compared to giving to strangers.
Using an extended AM design, [Fisman et al., 2015b] measure the distributional pref-
erences of a highly elite group of students (students at Yale Law School), an intermediate
elite group of students (students at the University of California, Berkley), and a represen-
tative sample of Americans (a sample drawn from the American Life Panel). They find
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that the elite sample is significantly more focused on efficiency relative to equality than is
the U.S. public.1
AM implement a different payout method compared to a standard dictator game. In a
standard dictator game, subjects are assigned specific roles as either a dictator or a recipi-
ent. Dictators then allocate a certain amount of money (endowment) between themselves
and the recipient whom they are randomly paired with. Notice recipients don’t make any
decisions despite being paid. In AM all subjects make allocation decisions. They are
paid twice, once as a dictator and once as a recipient. In other words, subjects play both
roles. Following AM, most of the papers using the modified dictator games also adopt the
dual-role procedure.
In a study with similar motivation to our own, [Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011] compare
discrete dictator games, where subjects make a series of choices among three options (a
selfish action, an efficiency-enhancing altruistic act, and an efficiency-reducing spiteful
act) with and without “role uncertainty” in dictator games. With role certainty, subjects
are assigned a role ahead of time and make a decision and are paid only for that decision.
With role uncertainty all subjects play as dictators, and then half are assigned to be recipi-
ents. Their design allowed them to classify subjects as selfish, social welfare maximizers
(preferring efficiency), inequality averse or competitive. Their results show that with role
certainty, selfish and inequality averse types dominate (with 44% and 25% respectively).
However, role uncertainty substantially increases the proportion of social welfare maxi-
mizers (from 21% to 74%) and decreases the proportion of selfish (to 21%) and inequality
averse (to 4%).
Playing both roles has been shown to impact behavior in other experimental games. In
trust games, [Burks et al., 2003] find that playing both roles increases selfish behavior, re-
1However, it is worth noting that they used different procedures for the two samples. We revisit their
findings in the conclusion below.
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ducing both the degree of trust and the degree of reciprocity. Playing both roles has mixed
effects in ultimatum games: [Carter and Irons, 1991] found that proposer demands were
greater if subjects play both roles compared to the standard single-role ultimatum game,
but [Güth and Tietz, 1990] found that proposers who play both roles are more likely to
select 50/50 splits than those who do not. The various results suggest that an examination
of the effects of the dual-role and single-role procedure for dictator games is warranted.
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
To test the effect of a dual-role procedure on subjects’ behaviour in the AM modified
dictator games, we adopt a between-subject design with two treatments. Subjects in both
treatments played a series of dictator games that includes the eleven decisions in AM and
two additional decisions. Each of the decision problems differed by the number of tokens
to be divided and by the relative price of giving, expressed as the number of points a token
is worth to each subject. Tokens were worth 1, 2, 3 or 4 points each. The total number of
tokens varied between 40 and 100. Table 3.3 provides the details of the thirteen budgets
offered to subjects.
Subjects were told that at the end of the experiment, one of the thirteen decisions would
be chosen at random for payment and each point was worth $0.10 in payoff. In the SR
treatment, as in a standard dictator game, subjects were assigned either the dictator role or
the recipient role before dictators made allocation decisions. Our DR treatment replicated
the procedure in AM, where each subject was both a dictator and a recipient.
From November to December 2015, we recruited a total of 114 undergraduate students
to participate in six sessions: 42 in DR and 72 in SR. The experiments were conducted
in the Economic Research Lab at Texas AM University. Subjects were recruited using
ORSEE [Greiner, 2015] The experiments were computerized using zTree [Fischbacher, 2007].
Each session lasts on average 45 minutes. The average earnings was $12.13. Subjects earn
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Budget Token Hold Value Pass Value Relative Price
Endowment of Giving
1 40 1 4 0.25
2 40 1 3 0.33
3 40 3 1 3
4 40 4 1 4
5 60 1 3 0.33
6 60 1 2 0.5
7 60 1 1 1
8 60 2 1 2
9 60 3 1 3
10 75 1 2 0.5
11 75 2 1 2
12 80 1 1 1
13 100 1 1 1
Table 3.1: Allocation Choices
on average $10.50 in SR, and $15.75 in DR. A $5 participation fee was paid to all partici-
pants. Upon arrival, participants were randomly seated at computer terminals. A random
payment ID was given to each participant. The instructions were read aloud by the exper-
imenter. A quiz was included at the end of the instructions to ensure subjects understand
nature of the game and the payoffs. We ensure anonymity throughout the experiment. All
subjects in DR sessions, but only the designated dictators in the SR sessions, made deci-
sions that determined the payoffs for both dictators and recipients. In the SR treatment,
recipients were asked to fill in a questionnaire that had no influence on their payoffs while
dictators were making decisions. Subjects then filled out an exit survey before being paid
privately by an assistant not involved with the experiment in a separate room.
3.4 Results
We begin by examining whether the data in our study is similar to other dictator game
studies. For those budgets with a relative price of giving equal to one (as in standard
dictator games), our subjects passed 28 percent of the endowment on average, which is
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similar to the pass rates reported in the literature [Camerer, 2003, Engel, 2011]. Our results
in the DR treatment replicated those reported by AM, with subjects giving 22.45 percent
of tokens endowed, quite similar to the 23 percent average giving reported in theirs. We
were unable to find significant differences between the average tokens passed for any of
the thirteen choices.
Next we check whether our subjects in both DR and SR behave rationally in the sense
that their choices are consistent with GARP. Following AM, we use Afriat’s (1972) Critical
Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) to measure the severity of violations. CCEI shows the largest
value by which the endowments must be multiplied to avoid violations. The closer the
CCEI is to one, the less we would have to shrink any budgets to avoid violations. Following
Varian (1991), we choose a threshold of 0.95 as a cutoff to establish that subjects are
rational. Our subjects exhibit a high degree of rationality in all three treatments. Of the
114 dictators in our experiment, 6 had violations CCEI indices of less than .95 (12 percent).
Over 90 percent of subjects made choices that are consistent with utility maximization, 89
percent in SR (32/36), and 95 percent in DR (40/42). The 95 percent in DR is close to the
98 percent rationality reported in AM.
We now turn to the effect of having subjects playing both roles in the game, beginning
with the effect on amount passed. Table 3.4 details the average amount our subjects chose
to share for each of the budgets in both DR and SR treatments. The final column contains
the p-values for tests comparing SR with DR giving.
Subjects in our DR decisions passed 22 percent of their endowments compared to 35
percent in the SR decisions. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test yields a p-value of 0.0034,
indicating a significant difference in giving. When we compare decisions played for each
of the budgets in SR and DR, we find that subjects in DR are more sensitive to relative
price of giving. Subjects in DR passed significantly less than those in SR when the relative
price of giving is greater or equal to one.
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Budget Token Relative Price Tokens Passed Tokens Passed P-value
Endowment of Giving in SR in DR
1 40 0.25 12.94 14.10 0.847
2 40 0.33 11.94 14.02 0.747
5 60 0.33 20.42 20.24 0.488
6 60 0.5 20.53 17.95 0.528
10 75 0.5 27.69 23.5 0.269
7 60 1 22.78 11.36 0.000
12 80 1 30.83 16.31 0.000
13 100 1 35.83 19.64 0.001
8 60 2 20.56 8.21 0.001
11 75 2 25.97 11.1 0.002
3 40 3 14.58 5.79 0.001
9 60 3 22.36 7.5 0.000
4 40 4 15 4.88 0.001
Table 3.2: Total Contribution
To determine how playing both roles affects subjects’ behaviour in the modified dicta-
tor games, we conduct regression analysis with the tokens passed as dependent variable.
Table 3.4 reports the results of a random effects model with standard errors clustered at
individual level. We find that subjects in single role sessions on average give more. While
subjects in both treatments give more when endowment increases, only subjects in dual
role sessions are sensitive to the price of giving. The sensitivity to price for dual role sub-
jects stays significant after controlled for subjects’ demographics and self-reported past
giving and volunteering.
Finally we examine how preferences for giving differ across treatments. Given that the
majority of our subjects’ behavior is rational, we can estimate a structural model of utility
that represents their preferences. With thirteen observations per subjects, we can estimate
the preference for giving at the individual level.
We denote person self and other as s and o, respectively. Consider the choices of person
s have consequences for his own payoff, pis, and the payoff of the other person, pio. For
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Dependent Variable: Tokens Passed (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dual Role -8.219*** -8.219*** -3.835 -4.511
(-3.37) (-3.37) (-1.17) (-1.25)
Endowment 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.244***
(7.12) (7.12) (7.09)
Price -1.693** -0.0710 -0.071
(-2.13) (-0.06) (-0.06)
Price*Dual Role -3.013** -3.013**
(-2.09) (-2.08)
Constant 21.65*** 9.280*** 6.919** 8.688
(12.34) (3.35) (2.26) (0.92)
Control Variables Yes
Observations 1014 1014 1014 1014
R-squared 0.0571 0.1487 0.1595 0.1788
t statistics in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
- Random effects model with standard errors clustered at individual level.
- Model 4 controls for demographics and self reported past giving.
Table 3.3: Effect of Dual Role Procedure (Regression Results)
each individual we estimate the utility function with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) functional form:
Us = (αpi
ρ
s + (1− α)piρs)1/ρ
where α represents the relative weight on the payoff for self (α = 1 when perfectly self-
ish); ρ captures the curvature of the indifference curves, with σ = 1/(ρ− 1) the elasticity
of substitution between one’s own payoff and that of the other. As ρ → 1 preferences are
perfect substitutes. When ρ → −∞ preferences are Leontief. As ρ → 0, the indifference
curves approach those of a Cobb-Douglas function, which implies that the expenditures
on tokens kept and given are equal to fractions α and 1 − α of the endowment m. Thus
ρ > 0 indicates that distributional preferences are weighted towards increasing total pay-
offs, whereas ρ < 0 indicates distributional preferences are weighted towards reducing
differences in payoffs.
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With the normalized budgets pis + (po/ps)pio = m/ps, or pis + ppio = m′, the demand
function for the CES utility function is written as:
pis(p,m
′) =
[α/(1− α)]ρ/(1−ρ)
p−ρ/(1−ρ) + [α/(1− α)]ρ/(1−ρ)m
′
=
A
pr + A
m′,
where r = −ρ/(1− ρ), and A = [α/(1− α)]ρ/(1−ρ).
We estimate A and r using two-limit Tobit maximum likelihood, reflecting the re-
striction that subjects’ choices are censored at both ends of the budget constraint, or
0 < pis/m
′ < 1. The estimated demand function is
pis(p,m
′)
m′
=
A
pr + A
+ ,
where  ∼ N(0, σ2). AM categorize subjects into groups and estimate the utility function
for each group of subjects. We estimate unique utility function for each individual subject.
The estimates of the two relevant parameters α and ρ reflect individual preferences
for giving. Figure 3.1 shows a scatterplot of αˆ and ρˆ, and compares the estimates across
the two treatments. Not surprisingly, most of our subjects are self-interested (αˆ > 1/2 for
almost all subjects in our experiment). Notice that in both treatments there is a great deal of
heterogeneity in preferences across subjects. Though we do see higher fraction of subjects
in DR procedure with positive, indicating the preferences for efficiency. Notice that the
perfectly selfish subjects (αˆ = 1) are almost all in the dual role treatment (turquoise dots
at the top of the figure), while most of the subjects with ρˆ < −.5 are in the single-role
treatment (orange dots to the left).
With estimates from the structural analysis, we classify subjects into the following
categories: purely selfish (αˆ = 1 and ρˆ = 0), efficiency focused (ρˆ > 0), and equality
29
Figure 3.1: CES Estimates
focused (ρˆ < 0). We find that the distribution of preferences is significantly affected by
whether a single-role procedure or a dual-role procedure is implemented (see Figure 3.2).
In SR, the majority of subjects are equality focused (53%), indicating a strong preference
for equal-payoffs. On the other hand, in DR, preferences for equality are frequent (19%).
The majority of dual role dictators have preferences for efficiency (62%). The selfish
preference is more frequent in DR than in SR (19% vs. 5%).
Given the large differences in the distribution of types in the two treatments, the ques-
tion naturally arises as to why the results are so different. Recall that in the introduction
we posited two possible factors that might affect the outcome. First, subjects might feel
greater empathy for their counterparts in the dual role setting, because they would be
more likely to consider themselves in the recipient role. We posited that this would make
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Preference
subjects more generous in the dual role treatment. However our data provide no sup-
port for this conjecture. Second we argued that subjects in the dual role treatment might
feel less responsible for their counterpart’s earnings, since one of the counterpart’s own
decisions would also be implemented. This would tend to decrease giving. Our data gen-
erally support that conjecture. To further explore the mechanism underlying the results,
we conducted an additional study described below, where each subject has another source
of earnings.
3.5 Additional Study
The single role lottery treatment (SR+L) adds an additional source of earnings - de-
scribed to the subjects as a lottery - for both players. This treatment only differs from SR
in that each subject had an opportunity to earn extra money through playing this lottery.
The lottery was played as follows. Subjects were asked to draw one card from a deck of 20
cards, each with a number representing the point value of the card. The number of points
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on the card drawn was converted to dollars (1 point = $0.10) and added to the payoffs of
subjects at the end of the experiment. Dictators and recipients were presented with differ-
ent decks, and therefore the expected payoffs from the lottery are different across roles.
The distribution of payoffs in the two lotteries matches the distribution of earnings in the
DR treatment from the other player’s decision. That is, for those in the dictator role in
SR+L, the points on the cards have a distribution equivalent to the distribution of points
received by the recipients in DR. In contrast, those in the recipient role SR+L played the
lottery where the points on the cards have a similar distribution to the points dictators in
DR decided to keep to themselves. Thus these payoffs mirror what a subject might ex-
pect to receive from their second-role payoff. By doing this, we replace the payoffs of the
second role with a lottery with same distribution of payoffs in DR. Figure 3.3 provide the
details of the lottery. (Recall that the distributions will not be symmetric because of the
differences in relative price of giving across decisions).
Figure 3.3: Payoff Distribution of Lottery
32
Four sessions of SR+L were conducted in March 2016. In total 72 subjects partici-
pated. All procedures in SR+L are the same as in SR except that subjects played a lottery
after the dictator game but before payment. Subjects in SR+L earn on average $16.89
including the $5 showup fee. Adding the extra source of payoffs reduced the percentage
of tokens passed from 35% in SR to 25.5% in SR+L (p = 0.0164). Figure 3.4 reports
the average percentages of tokens passed across all three treatments. The average level of
giving in SR+L is well below that in SR, and is now similar to that for the DR treatment.
Thus a simple examination of the average giving would lead us to believe that the reduced
responsibility argument is correct.
Figure 3.4: Mean Giving for Three Treatments
However, the SR+L results retain a key feature of the SR data: The insensitivity to
price of giving in Single Role sessions remained with the extra source of payoffs. Thus
reduced responsibility alone cannot fully account for the difference in treatments. To
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further explore the differences across treatments, Table 3.5 reports separate regression
results for each of the three treatments. Subjects passed more tokens to others when they
received higher endowment in all treatments, no matter whether they play both roles or
only the single role. But price has a strong effect on giving only in Dual Role sessions.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Tokens Passed Single Role Dual Role Single Role
Lottery
Endowment 0.391*** 0.118*** 0.289***
(9.02) (2.68) (6.35)
Price 0.484 -3.559*** 0.453
(0.37) (-3.94) (0.52)
Constant 7.294 -5.555 15.23
(0.58) (-0.30) (0.57)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 468 546 468
R2 0.19 0.16 0.22
t statistics in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
- Random effects model with standard errors clustered at individual level.
Table 3.4: Effect of Dual Role Procedure (Separate Regression Results)
Similarly to subjects in SR+L and DR, majority of our subjects in SR+L passed the
consistency test. 78 percent of subjects in SR+L has CCEI index greater than 0.95. We
then proceed to the analysis of our estimates of the individual CES utility parameters. The
distributions of types were determined as in the previous study, by classifying subjects
based on their estimated parameters. As shown in Figure 3.5, we see that subjects in the
DR sessions were substantially more efficiency-focused than subjects in the two single
role sessions: 62% of DR subjects are efficiency-focused (ρˆ > 0) versus only 42% and
39% of the SR and SR+L treatments. In addition, the DR subjects are less likely to be
classified as equality-focused and more likely to be selfish than are SR subjects: 19% of
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DR subjects are classified as equality-focused, as compared to 53% and 50% of singles
role subjects; conversely, 19% of DR subjects, 5% and 10% of SR and SR+L subjects,
respectively, are selfish.
Figure 3.5: Distribution of Preferences for Three Treatments
The additional results provide evidence that, while the reduced responsibility in DR
causes subjects to give less on average, it cannot explain why only the DR subjects are
responsive to the relative prices of giving but not the SR or SR+L subjects. We conclude
that playing both roles leads to different individual behaviour when compared to behavior
using the single role protocol. Furthermore, this difference is not due to the fact that there
is an additional source of payoffs total payoffs in the dual role protocols. The additional
treatment where we mimic the payoffs of dual role treatment in the single role case shows
similar classification of types.
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3.6 Does measure of altruism predict real life giving?
We have shown that playing both roles alters the measured revealed preferences for
giving relative to the single role protocol. Since giving generally occurs in an environment
where the donor is not at the same time a recipient of someone else’s generosity, we suspect
that the single-role measure is a more accurate representation of preferences.
There are a small number of papers examining the external validity of dictator game
results. This literature directly links the evidence from the lab to the field to study whether
the dictator game results are correlated with people’s real life altruistic behavior.
[Barr et al., 2010] and [Franzen and Pointner, 2013] used standard dictator game with sin-
gle role protocol and found evidence that pro-social behavior in the lab is correlated with
behavior in the field. In [Barr et al., 2010], the time teachers in Uganda spent lecturing
was positively correlated with their giving behavior in a dictator game.
[Franzen and Pointner, 2013] correlated behavior in a standard dictator game with real
choices made many weeks (4 to 5 weeks or 2 years) later and found pro-social behavior
in the lab and in the field were significantly correlated. Several papers that used simple
dictator game with single role protocol but replaced the recipient with real charities also
found dictator game results predict real life pro-social behavior [Benz and Meier, 2008,
Carpenter et al., 2008, Carpenter and Myers, 2010]. [Benz and Meier, 2008] compared stu-
dents’ giving behavior in a classroom dictator game with their decisions in a natural oc-
curring decision setting. They found that the dictator game results were correlated with
students’ charitable giving up to two years before and after the experiment. The corre-
lation ranged between 0.25 and 0.4. [Carpenter et al., 2008] found evidence that giving
in dictator games are positively correlated with altruism measured by responses to survey
questions among both students and random member of the community.
[Carpenter and Myers, 2010] found that altruism as measured by the dictator game is a
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key predictor of the real-life decision to volunteer, and that it is also positively corre-
lated with the time the volunteer firefighters dedicated to training with their co-volunteers.
[Galizzi and Navarro Martinez, 2015] found no correlation when compared dictator game
results with several behavior elicited in the field and with the self-reported past giving
behavior. But their subjects played the dictator game twice, once as dictator, and once as
recipient.
Current literature that examines correlation between dictator game results and real-
life giving behavior provides evidence consistent with our conjecture that the single-role
measure is more accurate. In order to test this conjecture, we conduct additional analysis,
comparing elicited preferences with altruistic behavior. We ask which measure better
predicts self-reported charitable activity.
Self-reported giving is derived from answers to the post-experiment survey. Subjects
in all treatments filled out a survey in which we collected basic demographic informa-
tion: age, sex, ethnicity, family income, religion, and political ideology. We also asked
questions about their past giving behaviour.
In the analysis in Table 3.6, we compare the predictive power of the altruism measure
between the dual role protocol and the single role protocol. We estimate αˆ , the relative
weight on self-payoffs, for each participant. αˆ takes the value between 0 and 1. The closer
the value of αˆ to 1, the more selfish the person is. We expect αˆ to be negatively correlated
with real giving behaviour. We report the results of ordered logit regressions of past year’s
giving on αˆ for DR, SR, and SR+L separately in column 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3.6.
The dependent variable is the reported total amount given to any charitable organiza-
tions in the past year.2 All three columns include the demographic variables as control.
2In the post-experiment survey, subjects responded to the question: “How much money have you donated
to charitable organizations in the past year?” Subjects choose one of the following options: $0, $1-$10, $11-
$25, $26-$50, $50-$100, $101-$250, $251-$500, and >$500. 14% of our subjects chose $0; 19% chose
$1-$10; 24% chose $11-$25, 18%, 12%, 7%, 4% and 1% chose the rest of options, respectively. There is no
significant difference across three treatments.
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(1) (2) (3)
Dual Role Single Role Single Role+Lottery
α -2.737 -6.497** -4.830*
(-1.37) (-2.55) (-1.95)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42 36 42
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.13
Ordered log-odds(logit) regression coefficients are reported
t statistics in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Control variables include: age, gender, race, family income,
religion, weekly spending, and political ideology
Table 3.5: Predict Real Life Giving (Ordered Logit Regression Results)
The negative correlation of and past giving is consistent with our hypothesis. Though the
sign of the coefficient is similar between the dual role protocol and the single role protocol,
the single-role magnitude is larger, and only the measure from the single role protocol is
significantly correlated with past giving behaviour.
3.7 Conclusion
We find that playing both roles in dictator games appears to reduce altruistic behavior
and increase the sensitivity to the relative price of giving. Moreover, this method leads to a
higher estimate of the proportion of subjects with preferences for efficiency over equality,
as well as a higher proportion of subjects exhibiting selfish preferences.
An additional treatment with a single role protocol, but in which subjects earn similar
payoffs as in the dual role protocol, shows that it is not the differences in total payoffs
that drives the differences. We then conduct additional analysis comparing the estimated
altruism parameters with self-reported charitable giving, and find that only the single-role
estimates are significantly related to giving. We see this as an indication that the single-role
measure is a more accurate representation of preferences.
Our study provides evidence that the dual role protocol distorts the measure of elicited
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preferences, and suggests that we may want to rethink the way in which preferences are
elicited in the lab. It is tempting to use the strategy method in lab experiments, as this
gives the researcher a great deal more data than a single decision would provide. There
is increasing evidence that using the strategy method has an impact on behavior. Use of
the strategy method may be legitimate when this involves only contingent choices within
a single role, as when a trustee in the trust game is asked to specify the amount he wishes
to return for every possible amount sent. The evidence of the impact of this type of strat-
egy method usage is mixed [Brandts and Charness, 2011]. But our results suggest that
using the strategy method across roles may substantially distort subjects’ elicited altruistic
preferences.
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4. TRUST, ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL NORMS
4.1 Introduction
Matters of trust and trustworthiness practically occupy every aspect of our daily lives.
Our society and all of the activities we do together depend on trust. Economists also care a
great deal about trust. Trust has been shown to increases efficiency [Frank, 1988]. Higher
trust is associated with economic growth, lower corruption, more efficient judicial systems,
and higher quality government bureaucracies [Knack and Keefer, 1997, Guiso et al., 2004,
La Porta et al., 1997].
In recent years, economists have increasingly used laboratory experiments to measure
trust and trustworthiness. The trust game designed by [Berg et al., 1995] has become a
popular and well-replicated measure of trust and trustworthiness in the field. In a standard
trust game, each of two players is endowed with $10. During stage one, the first mover de-
cides to pass none, some, or all of her endowment to the second mover. The experimenter
triples the amount before it is passed on to the second mover. The second mover then has
the opportunity to return some or all of the tripled amount back to the first mover. The
amount the first mover decides to pass in the trust game represents trust, while the amount
returned by the second mover captures trustworthiness.
A large body of literature assumes that trust is motivated by expectations of reciprocity.
Trustworthiness, in turn, is typically assumed to be motivated only by reciprocity. How-
ever, the prosocial preferences literature suggests that altruism, or unconditional kindness
could induce people to trust or to be trustworthy. [Cox, 2004] designs a triadic trust game
to study this issue. He argues that the amount sent by the first mover in the trust game
confounds trust with altruism. Similarly, the second mover may be motivated by altruism,
inequality aversion, or reciprocity when passing positive amounts back. His design con-
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sists of three games. Game A is a standard trust game, and Game B is a dictator game
intended to capture altruism. Game B only differs from Game A in that the second mover
doesn’t make return decisions. Game C is a modified dictator game that captures fairness,
where the first mover does not make decisions. The results from Cox indicate that a portion
of the amount passed in trust game could be explained by not only trust or trustworthiness,
but also prosocial preferences such as altruism and fairness. However, since Cox employs
a between-subject design, we can not make inferences regarding how altruism and fairness
may predict individual trust and trustworthiness behavior. In this paper, we use a within-
subject design where the subjects participate in all three games in the triadic design. We
then examine whether individuals’ altruism and fairness are correlated with their trust and
trustworthiness behavior.
Trust and trustworthiness may be shaped by individuals’ prosocial preferences, but
they could also be influenced by social norms. The literature on prosocial behavior and
social norms shows that prosocial behavior is not only driven by preferences regarding
payoff distributions, but also those for following well-established social rules, the norms.
The existing literature studying norms in experimental economics primarily focuses on
dictator games and altruism. We contribute to the discussion by combining the trust and
the norms literature in experimental economics to study the relationship between norms
and trust.
We aim to better understand what factors influence an individual’ decision to trust.
We are specifically interested in answering the following two research questions:1) does
altruism explain individual trust and trustworthy behavior, and 2) is trust a norm? What
about trustworthiness? The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section
we describe the experimental design and procedures. In Section 4.3 we present our results.
Section 4.4 concludes.
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4.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment design consists of two parts. Experiment 1 is the triadic trust game
where subjects make choices. Experiment 2 describes the choice environment in Experi-
ment 1, then elicits the social norms over behavior in Experiment 1 from an independent
group of subjects who never play that triadic trust games.
4.2.1 Experiment 1: Triadic Trust Game
We employ a within-subject design in which subjects in Experiment 1 participate in
all three games, Game A, Game B, and Game C. These three games constitute the triadic
trust game design as in [Cox, 2004].
Game A: Both the first and second mover are endowed with 10 tokens. In the first
stage the first mover can transfer none, some, or all of her endowment (from 0 to 10
tokens) to the second mover. The amount the first mover decides to transfer is tripled
by the experimenter before being delivered to the second mover. In the second stage the
second mover has the opportunity to return none, some, or all of the amount she receives
from the first mover. Differing from [Cox, 2004], we use the strategy method asking the
second mover to make choices for every possible amount sent by the first mover.
Game B: Both the first and second mover are endowed with 10 tokens. Game B differs
from Game A only in that the second mover in Game B does not make decisions. The
game ends after the first stage.
Game C: The “first mover” is endowed with X tokens and the “second mover” is en-
dowed with 10 plus 3x(10-X) tokens. The “second mover” may transfer none, some, or all
of her 3x(10-X) tokens to the “first mover”. We again use the strategy method.
Our Experiment 1 differs from Cox’s design in two ways: 1) we employ a within-
subject design where subjects participate in all three games (Game A, Game B, and Game
C); 2) we use the strategy method asking the second mover to make choices for each
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possible action made by the first mover. The sequence in which subjects participate in
Game A, B, and C is randomly varied. Instructions were distributed independently before
each game.
4.2.2 Experiment 2: Norms Elicitation
[Krupka and Weber, 2013] (KW) propose using coordination games to measure social
norms, studying norm-driven behavior in dictator games. We adopt their coordination
game design and adjust it to measure norms in our triadic trust games.
In Experiment 2, subjects have the scenarios in the triadic trust games described to
them. They then judge each action taken by the first and second mover in each of the three
games as “very socially inappropriate,” “somewhat socially inappropriate,” “somewhat
socially appropriate,” or “very socially appropriate.” Subjects receive a reward if their
evaluation agrees with the majority of other subjects. Subjects therefore have an incentive
to reveal what they consider the jointly recognized perceptions of appropriateness of the
actions, but not their perceptions of the appropriateness of the actions. One of the actions
they evaluate is randomly selected for payment. If a subject’s evaluation for the chosen
action agrees with that of other subjects then they receive an extra $1 in addition to their
$1 base payment.
4.2.3 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
We conducted all experiments during May 2017. Subjects were recruited and paid
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We restricted our subject pool using the fol-
lowing criteria: 1) subjects are located in United States, 2) subjects must have had suc-
cessfully completed at least 50 prior Mechanical Turk assignments, and 3) subjects must
have had more than 90% of their previous assignments approved for payment. All experi-
ments consist of the following six parts: 1) consent form, 2) a bogus item that serves as a
deterrent for those who do not pay attention to instructions, 3) instructions for each game,
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4) quizzes to make sure subjects understand each game, 5) games, and 6) an exit survey.
The experiments were programmed in Qualtrics. Subjects who satisfied the criteria and
signed up for the experiment were directed to complete all tasks on Qualtrics.
In total 132 subjects participated in our study: 90 in the triadic trust game, and 42 in
the norm elicitation experiment. All subjects received $1 on completing all the tasks, plus
an additional payment ranging from $0 to $4 based on decisions made in the experiments.
4.3 Results
We begin our discussion of the results by analyzing the data generated from our triadic
trust games. We then combine the norms data with the trust game decisions to predict
behavior.
4.3.1 Trust, Trustworthiness, and Altruism
Overview
First, we notice that the average amounts transferred and returned in our triadic trust
games are surprisingly close to the standard results from trust and dictator games despite
the substantial differences in our design versus earlier studies, as well as using a subject
pool different from the standard undergraduate students. Typically dictators send approx-
imately 20 percent while the first movers send approximately 50 percent of their endow-
ment, and the second movers return about the amount that the first movers sent to them
[Camerer, 2003]. In our experiment, on average the first mover sends 4.47 tokens (45%),
and the second mover returns 3.88 tokens (see Figure 4.1). We find that 12 out of 43 first
movers sent all of their 20 token endowments and 17 sent zero tokens. In total more than
60 percent subjects sent a positive amount to their paired second movers.
Although both subjects are endowed with 10 tokens in Game B, we still observe that
the first movers transfer some positive amount to the second movers. On average the first
movers pass 1.58 tokens, or 16% of their endowment (see Figure 4.2). Consistent with
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Figure 4.1: Trust and Trustworthiness
Cox’s findings, we find that altruism does play a role in the first mover’s trust decisions.
Figure 4.3 shows the comparison of the amounts sent in Game A versus Game B. The
grey bars represent Game A data and the black solid bars represent Game B data. Although
more subjects in Game B sent zero tokens than those in Game A, we still find that 28%
of our first movers sent positive amounts to their paired subjects. There is evidence of
altruism in the data.
Game C is designed to capture preferences for fairness among the second movers in
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Figure 4.2: Altruism
trust games. On average “the second movers” in Game C “returned” 3.83 tokens to their
paired subjects; 42% of them sent positive amounts. We accordingly find strong evidence
for fairness in our data (Figure 4.4).
Analysis
Our within-subject design allows us to examine the correlation between altruism and
trust, as well as that between fairness and trustworthiness. We also collect survey measures
of trust and trustworthiness in the exist survey. We could further examine how well the
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Figure 4.3: Trust and Altruism
survey measures predict subjects’ trust and trustworthiness behavior in trust games. We
report our results as follows.
Result 1. Altruism predicts trust.
Table 4.1 reports the regression results of trust on altruism. In all three models (Columns
1, 2 and 3) we find that altruism as measured by the amount sent in Game B is significantly
correlated with trust as measured by the amount sent in Game A.
Result 1.1. Survey measure of trust predicts trust.
National surveys such as the General Social Survey (GSS) ask attitudinal questions to
measure trust. The general trust question reads “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others?”
(GSS trust). Together with “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you
if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” (GSS fair), and “Would you say
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Figure 4.4: Fairness
that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out
for themselves?” (GSS help), these survey questions measure individuals’ confidence in
others. We ask these three questions during the exist survey. We then construct a GSS
trust index that equally weighs the answers to these three questions. Columns 2 and 3
in Table 4.1 include both altruism and the GSS trust index as predictors. We find that
although altruism is still the strongest predictor of trust, the survey measure also provides
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(1) (2) (3)
Altruism 0.714*** 0.686 *** 0.602***
(3.57) (3.60) (3.00)
GSS Trust Index 0.469** 0.399*
(2.41) (1.89)
Constant 3.243*** 3.284 *** 1.4
(5.24) (5.58) (0.58)
Control Variables Yes
Observations 47 47 47
Pseudo R-squared 0.221 0.311 0.455
Dependent Variable:Trust (Amount Sent in Game A)
t statistics in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.1: Altruism Predicts Trust
explanatory power for subjects’ trust behaviors.
Result 2. Both fairness and trust predict trustworthiness. Table 4.3.1 reports the re-
gression results of trustworthiness on fairness. In Column 1, trust, measured by the amount
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust 0.878*** 0.305 *** 0.303*** 0.308***
(22.23) (10.68) (10.56) (10.67)
Fairness 0.790 *** 0.792*** 0.786***
(32.09) (31.64) (31.20)
GSS Trust Index -0.049 -0.059
(-0.45) (-0.51)
Constant -0.347 -0.194 -0.194 -3.14
(-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-1.32)
Control Variables Yes
Observations 473 473 473 473
Pseudo R-squared 0.277 0.792 0.793 0.83
Dependent Variable:Trust (Amount Sent in Game A)
t statistics in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.2: Fairness and Trust Predict Trustworthiness
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sent in Game A, strongly predicts trustworthiness; the more the first mover trusts, the more
the second mover reciprocates. When including fairness in the model (Columns 2, 3, and
4), we find that both trust and fairness are positively correlated with the amount “returned”
in Game C. GSS trust index doesn’t predict trustworthiness.
4.3.2 Norms
Following KW we implement a decision model where the decision maker cares about
both the monetary payoff and the degree to which the action is collectively perceived as
socially appropriate:
u(αk) = βpi(αk) + γN(αk)
where pi(αk) is the payoff from the selected action αk, and N(αk) is the appropriate-
ness of the chosen action αk. β captures how much individuals care about the payoffs
from their actions. γ represents the degree to which individuals are willing to conform to
the norms of their actions.
Hypothesis 1. β > 0; individuals care about their own monetary payoff when they
decide to trust or reciprocate.
Hypothesis 2. γ > 0; individuals care about following norms when they decide to
trust or reciprocate.
Result 3. Trust could be explained by both preferences for monetary payoffs and
following norms.
Table 4.3 reports the estimates from our decision model. Column 2 reports the param-
eter estimates for β and γ. As we expected, our subjects care about the monetary payoffs
of their decisions (β = 0.3). They also strongly conform to the norms of trust (γ = 2.84).
However, we do not find an effect of norms on altruism though (γ not significant in Col-
umn 4).
Result 4. Trustworthiness could be explained by following norms. Table 4.4 reports
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Trust Trust Altruism Altruism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary Payoff (β) -0.073 0.300 ** 0.515*** 0.734*
(-1.56) (2.18) (6.38) (1.78)
Appropriateness Rating (γ) 2.840*** 1.294
(2.73) (0.55)
N 517 517 517 517
Log-likelihood -111.5 -107.3 -77.63 -77.47
t statistics in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.3: Trust, Altruism and Norms
the estimates for our decision model for trustworthiness. Individuals strongly conform to
Trustworthiness Trustworthiness Fairness Fairness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary Payoff (β) -0.002 0.0.002 0.001 0.001
(-0.23) (2.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Appropriateness Rating (γ) 1.459*** 1.786***
(9.14) (11.16)
N 3555 3555 3555 3555
Log-likelihood -558.4 -513.1 -554.7 -478.6
t statistics in parentheses,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.4: Trustworthiness, Fairness, and Norms
the norms of being trustworthy (γ = 1.459); and also follow norms of fairness (γ = 1.786).
Our results suggest the presence of social norms that elicit both trusting and trustwor-
thy behavior.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper we combine the trust and norms literature in experimental economics to
study the relationship of trust, trustworthiness, altruism, and norms. We aim to better un-
derstand what factors influence individuals’ decisions to trust. We answer two research
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questions in this chapter: 1) does altruism explain individual trust and trustworthy behav-
ior, and 2) is trust a norm? What about trustworthiness?
We find that altruism predicts trust, while both fairness and trust predict trustwor-
thiness. We also find that the survey measure of trust is positively correlated with that
measured using trust games. Regarding following norms, we find that both trust and trust-
worthiness could be explained by following norms. Our results suggest the presence of
norms elicit both trusting and trustworthy behavior. Our findings highlight the importance
of studying the effect of norms in other-regarding behaviors. Identifying differences in
norms of trust and trustworthiness across different cultures could be an important area for
future research.
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5. SUMMARY
In contrast to the self-interest hypothesis of standard economic theory, in reality indi-
viduals are surprisingly generous. For instance, according to the Giving USA 2017 report,
charitable giving was estimated to be $390 billions in the United States in 2016, or more
than 2% of GDP. This self-interest hypothesis has also been rejected in a large number
of laboratory experiments where people have displayed a willingness to simply give away
money to other participants even when the decisions are made anonymously. The three
essays of this dissertation are focus on studying prosocial behavior.
This dissertation contributes to the literature that asks what motivates prosocial behav-
ior and what factors affect individuals’ prosocial behaviors. In the first essay, we study
the impact of volunteer leaders on individual’s giving. By experimentally examining the
impact of three factors including the status of the leader, information, and social distance,
we find evidence that allowing volunteer leaders increases charitable giving. The second
essay is about measuring altruism, the underlying motive for giving. We find that the dual
role protocol distorts the measurement of altruism. Our findings will provide an important
input to the future research on the motives of charitable giving. The final essay examines
the effect of social norms on prosocial behavior. We combine the trust and norms literature
to study how social norms influence trust and trustworthiness behavior. We find that both
trust and trustworthiness could be explained by following norms.
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